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Introduction: Emerging regions worldwide increasingly involve cross-border relations. The Pearl River Delta (PRD) in
south China in particular has been the focus of investigation in the recent literature on multiple jurisdiction regions, but
with very little attention to Macao. Macao’s position in the region differs from that of Hong Kong, the other Special
Administrative Region (SAR), for historical, economic and geopolitical reasons. Gaming has delivered wealth, along with
social problems and growing dependency on the Mainland on a land base that is very small and geographically complex.
Breaking out of its isolation as a post-colonial backwater involves redefining the relationship with neighbouring Zhuhai
on the Mainland with hopes for stronger links with Hong Kong.
Case description: An ambitious reclamation project will add about 350 ha of land to the territory, including
underground space and transport infrastructure.
Discussion and Evaluation: Commodifying the new territories engages the Macao SAR in a role complementary to that
outlined for Zhuhai. The gamble is that real estate-led development will support an economy that continues to depend
largely on gaming. While the focus in the burgeoning literature on emerging regions is almost exclusively on institutional
and economic integration, this paper looks at how cross-border integration may also involve urban plans.
Conclusions: It is argued that extra-territorial pressures and rescaling of governance in the PRD are drivers for the
development plans now being implemented.Background
In the last several years, there has been much research on
emerging regions under the forces of globalisation, particu-
larly those involving multiple states, intra-state regional
authorities and cities, as well as supra-territorial agencies. It
is argued by several investigators (Otgaar et al., 2008; Shen,
2014; Luo and Shen, 2012) that regional integration takes
different forms and engages different scales across the
globe. For example, European cities have focussed on urban
policies while leaving regulatory and macro-economic
matters to state and inter-state authority (Brenner, 2004).
By contrast, in the PRD, institutional integration has lagged
behind economic integration (Shen, 2014). In fact, the PRD
appears to be a significant exception in Brunet-Jailly's
(2005) thesis that closer economic ties are accompanied by
cooperative institutional arrangements and eventually by
social integration. While economic integration betweenCorrespondence: zachariasjohn478@gmail.com
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in any medium, provided the original work is pHong Kong and Shenzhen in particular has been rapid and
of immense proportions, significant tensions have arisen in
the social sphere and to a lesser extent at the institutional
level (Yang and Li, 2013). Macao’s economic integration
with its Mainland partner, Zhuhai, is quite different from
that of Hong Kong and with the relative absence of obvious
conflictual relations.
Integration has often led to imbalances across the region
(Timberlake et al., 2014), which may also fuel intra-
regional rivalry and difficulties in forging cooperative
arrangements (Li et al., 2014). The PRD is a case in point,
where a singular focus on the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-
Hong Kong corridor has left peripheral areas and indeed
the whole west half of the Pearl River estuary relatively
under-developed. Unified labour markets under shorten-
ing travel times have also brought enormous disparities in
income within individual cities, a source of tension, and
an impediment to the hoped-for social pact. City-led
development has not addressed these disparity issues–
arguably accentuating them–with these issues referred
upward to regional and state authorities.Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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intensifying competition. Guangzhou and Shenzhen vie
for pre-eminence as global business centres in the PRD,
aiming to challenge Hong Kong’s role as global capital
with its financial sector and high concentration of produ-
cer services (Sassen, 1991). The west side of the PRD, with
smaller cities in a landscape still dominated by agriculture,
claims a better environment and higher quality of life.
Although Zhuhai is promoting its own central business
district, it hopes to achieve second-tier status by adopting
the twin city concept promoted by Shenzhen in its relation
with Hong Kong (Shen, 2014). Quality of life and access to
a less urbanised environment are key advantages of
Macao-Zhuhai, as expressed in the Guangdong provincial
integration plan of 2009 (Yang and Li, 2013). While Hong
Kong has resisted some of these concepts emanating
from the Mainland, Macao government has embraced
them, as exemplified in the plan discussed below.
This examination of Macao links its recent emergence
as a prosperous gambling hub to its development plans
for the longer term. The rapid growth of the gaming
industry in Macao is well documented, leading to much
investigation of the particular nature of the tourism indus-
try in this self-administered part of China, as well as
consideration of the social consequences of gaming as an
economic mainstay. The recent proposal for a final
massive expansion of its landmass has hardly been
reported internationally and in particular, has not been
related to the new relationship with the Mainland
generated by gaming. This topic is important, not only
because it represents a bridgehead for Chinese central gov-
ernment policy on its own territory and throughout East
and South-East Asia, but also highlights the critical role
urban planning can play in this new inter-governmental re-
lationship. The present article reports on an investigation
by the author in several visits to the region from 2010 to
2013, a review of local planning reports, attendance and
participation in a number of public hearings, and a series
of semi-structured interviews with twenty local planners
working for the utilities and advisory planning institutes, as
well as the consultant planning firms.
The research focusses on the Five-Islands plan, the most
significant single development project ever undertaken in
Macao and an end-game given the present political arrange-
ments between central government and the SAR. The plans
address current needs as defined, while claiming a direction
for the long-term future. The proposals also strengthen a
dependency on the Mainland, the source of the SAR’s pros-
perity, by joining its own residential development to a new
business core for Zhuhai. Similar efforts by Shenzhen to de-
velop Qianhai as a lure for the Hong Kong financial indus-
try and its highly paid workforce have so far been rebuffed.
The difference in approach is partly explained by history
and partly by the precarious economic prosperity of Macao.Macao was founded by Portugal in 1557 on peninsular
Macao at the mouth of the Zhujiang (Pearl) River. Built
as a trading post on the Sea Silk Route, the colony was
officially established in 1887 and was granted substantial
autonomy by Portugal in 1976, following the overthrow
of the dictatorship in Lisbon. The offshore state is also
an interesting mosaic of Portuguese colonial culture,
Cantonese traditions and a somewhat conflicted relation-
ship with the Chinese central government (Hao, 2011).
For example, unlike Hong Kong, Macao citizens generally
embraced the new political relationship with Beijing after
1999 while exercising substantial local autonomy.
After the hand-over to China December 20th, 1999,
the Macao SAR examined its options for development.
It lagged far behind prosperous Hong Kong, lacking
both the deep-sea port and land base that enabled its
sister city to become one of the economic powerhouses
of Asia. By comparison, Macao was a quiet backwater,
rife with crime, suffering a weak economy, official cor-
ruption and a small market (Luke, 2010). In an effort to
reposition itself regionally and to promote itself eco-
nomically, Macao liberalised the gaming industry in
2002, which had until then been a family-run monopoly.
Macao became by far the largest gaming centre in the
world, with seven times the activity of Las Vegas and
29.3 million visitors in 2013 (Statistics and Census Ser-
vice 2004). China, which does not have a legal gambling
system, finds it convenient to have Macao as a close-by
outlet for Mainlanders, who must obtain a permit to
visit from the Mainland authorities. The number of visits
per individual is restricted and not combinable with a
visit to Hong Kong. As a consequence, visitors to Macao
have grown dramatically, now exceeding those to Hong
Kong. This relatively small city saw its GDP grow very
rapidly over the last decade, now fourth per capita in the
world. Part of Taipa and a much larger part of Coloane,
the southern island, together the so-called Cotai, are
now devoted to casinos and related services. Breaking
out of its doldrums has so far meant transforming itself
into a gambling venue for Mainland Chinese.
While the gaming industry has raised income levels to
among the highest in Asia, sudden wealth has come with
substantial social problems (Wan, 2012). The school
dropout rate has increased as students depart early for
lucrative jobs in relatively low-skilled casino work. Gam-
bling addiction has continued to rise, while Hong Kong
and Singapore have succeeded in reducing their rates. A
rapid rise in crime levels and prostitution has attended
the growth in the gaming industry, as they have in other
gaming centres (Allock, 2000). While some of the social
pathologies are associated with rapid economic growth,
observers tend to agree such problems are exacerbated
by the dependency on gaming for economic growth
(Petry, 2003). Despite these disturbing trends, widely
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level of satisfaction with the quality of life in the city
(Rato and Davey, 2012), along with an acceptance of the
gaming industry’s role in delivering that quality of life. In
a bid to diversify its economy away from heavy depend-
ence on gaming, “leisure activity” and creative industry
are now emphasised. The existing landmass makes this
diversification effort difficult (Hsu and Gu, 2010). A
large part of the Macao peninsula is occupied by an exten-
sive UNESCO World Heritage site (2005), the original
Portuguese settlement, Lingnan-style courtyard homes of
the early Chinese business immigrants, churches and mili-
tary facilities. The remaining territory has been developed
at high density to accommodate the Macao Cantonese-
speaking majority, now 85% of the population. In spite of
substantial efforts at promotion, these world-class assets
have failed to attract increased tourist revenues (Huang
et al., 2012), yet the local government remains hopeful that
its plan will do just that. All development to date has been
built without underground facilities, such that even the
parking garages are in elevated structures above the street-
level commercial floors. A large part of the available land
resource and much of the already reclaimed land has been
handed over to international gaming interests, who have
replicated the Vegas experience for China and Asia (Balsas,
2013). The burgeoning gaming industry has gobbled
up nearly all the available land resources, making it
very difficult for Macao to service this industry, let alone
develop and exploit its rich colonial heritage. Housing the
thousands of casino workers is itself an enormous chal-
lenge that the existing landmass and urban development
cannot meet (Hsu and Gu, 2010). Finally, air pollution and
road congestion have accompanied the loss of lands ori-
ginally destined for housing, public facilities and parks,
now occupied by the casinos. Thus, the islands proposal,
which excludes any future casino development, is in fact
an adjunct to the casino economy of Macao in as much
as it aims to service and complete its infrastructure
(Luke, 2010).
Although overall economic growth in Macao since lib-
eralisation of the gaming industry in 2002 has been for-
midable, the financial crisis of 2008 resulted in a sharp
drop in growth. In fact, overall revenues actually de-
clined in that year and again in 2014 with the crackdown
on corruption and prostitution by the central govern-
ment. Casino construction projects suddenly halted and
there were thousands of layoffs. While few sectors are
immune from global economic crises, recent develop-
ments on the Mainland underscore the importance of a
more diversified approach to local economic develop-
ment. In addition, arrivals are in the great majority from
Mainland China and subject to restriction by Mainland
authorities. While the number of allowed visits to Macao
was marginally increased in recent years, it is alsoimaginable that they could subsequently be reduced. A
minor change in the regulation could have devastating im-
pact on the casino industry. Singapore and other South-
east Asian destinations are developing casinos to serve a
Chinese population that is increasingly on the move.
Across the mouth of the Zhujiang River, Shenzhen
prospered after the Reform and Opening Up through in-
ward investment from Hong Kong. Today Shenzhen has
twice the population of Hong Kong and is China’s fourth
city in terms of GDP. Zhuhai enjoyed the same loca-
tional advantage with regard to extra-territorial Macao
in 1978, but there was little inflow of investment funds
from Macao for reasons mentioned above. As a conse-
quence, cities in the western wing of the Pearl River
Delta languished in the twenty years following Reform.
However, in the last several years, investment in highway
infrastructure in particular, along with new bridge cross-
ings to the east have re-invigorated the local economy.
The latest overtures of Zhuhai include a Central Busi-
ness District directly opposite Macao and using the
Shizimen Strait as direct access from the sea. Although
somewhat removed from the core of present-day Zhuhai,
this location is a symbolic invitation for direct inward in-
vestment from Macao, while promising integration.
Macao is accumulating capital at a formidable rate. Such
an approach is quite different from that of Shenzhen,
where the proposed CBD of Qianhai is intended to in-
vite the direct transfer of CBD activities from Hong
Kong to a new location quite removed from present-day
Hong Kong.
Macao SAR has accumulated substantial capital re-
serves, allowing it to launch an ambitious programme to
accommodate continued growth in its population, a di-
versification of its economy and a final expansion of the
land area from the present 29.2 km2. The population in-
creased from 435,000 to 544,000 between 2001 and
2010, largely through the granting of work visas. The
plan is to allow the population to increase further by
more than 100,000, almost entirely through immigration.
The permanent resident population is insufficient to
support the booming service industries alone, while
Macao’s birthrate is well below the replacement level.
Thus, sustained economic growth and the attendant
population increase, largely in work-visa residents, ex-
plain the current effort to expand the landmass and the
developed urban area.
The five islands development proposal
It is important to note that Macao had no planning sys-
tem in place at the time of the hand-over and has only
tentatively proceeded with consultations and formal ap-
provals. At the time of writing, Macao does not have a
planning department within the government, but does
rely on the services of a consulting Planning Institute.
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its legacy of formal planning under British rule (Bristow,
1989), and a public system since the hand-over. In 2011,
the government launched its first major public consult-
ation on the ambitious expansion of territorial Macao, to
reclaim more than 3 km2 of seabed, mostly between the
historic peninsula and the conjoined Taipa and Coloane
islands, but also off its eastern coast (Figure 1), thus
increasing the total land area by about 10%. Various con-
sultancy inputs were used to prepare an options docu-
ment for public consultation in early 2012 (Macao,
2012). The China Academy of Urban Planning and De-
sign (CAUPD)–a Mainland state-owned consultancy
and the largest in China– prepared the final proposal
for public consultation.
Further sea reclamations are impossible under the
current arrangements between the central government
and the SAR, as well as the arrangements made with
Zhuhai for access through the Shizimen Strait. The wa-
ters surrounding peninsular and island Macao are not
part of the SAR, while the reclamations are confined to
the narrow Macao-controlled strait between these lands.
Nearly half of peninsular Macao is occupied by theFigure 1 The reclamation areas of Macao are shown in five main part
the author from the government reports).World Heritage Site, one of the most important in Asia
and already under considerable pressure from develop-
ment at its perimeter and within. Coloane is also a sensi-
tive environment, with historic seaside settlements and
the largest green space in the territory.
Besides the urban development on the reclamation areas
(Figure 1), the proposed customs port (5 in Figure 1)
will handle goods travelling between Hong Kong, Macao
and Zhuhai. Macao has also managed to strike a deal with
Zhuhai, to develop a campus for the University of Macao
on Hengqin Island, linked by a bridge to the territory
but surrounded by a moat and patrolled security
fence. Further colonisation efforts on Hengqin Island,
once part of Macao, are likely to be resisted since
Macao continues to operate according to its own legal
and monetary system, while Zhuhai gains little except
financial compensation for the lease of lands.
A bridge was proposed and approved by the Macao
government and the Chinese central government that
will soon link Hong Kong, Macao and Zhuhai, with the
intention of supporting the important role of tourism in
the three city economies (Hsu and Gu, 2010). Hong
Kong approved the building of its end of the bridge onlys, amounting to approximately 3 km2 of land area (redrawn by
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vironmental impact analyses (Tromans, 2012), while the
Macao end began in earnest in 2004. The difference in
timing reflects a much weaker planning and environ-
mental impact assessment system in Macao compared
with Hong Kong, but also reflects differences in the stra-
tegic interests of the partners (Yang, 2006; Yang and Li,
2013). Until the bridge, the usual way to travel between
these cities was by jet boat or by air. These proposals re-
ceived rapid approval from Guangdong provincial au-
thorities and the central government, in part because the
west side of the Zhujiang River has lagged far behind the
east side in economic development. The central govern-
ment has also publicly exhorted Macao’s government to
pursue economic diversification, which in the case of the
customs port, takes the form of integration in a single
controlled facility.
Four of the proposed islands are for urban development
while the fifth is the new controlled customs port, under
active development in 2014. The other four islands will
likely take a form that is quite unusual for Macao or any
other waterfront city in South China. To a certain degree,
the “islands” idea is a nostalgic reminder that Macao was
originally a chain of small islands, now reduced to one
through various reclamations. The loss of accessible water-
front in Macao is thus compensated by the addition of a
lengthy new waterfront. The waterfront areas (20 km) will
be entirely devoted to green space and will not have
motorised transport unlike present-day Macao. The plan
specifically calls for pedestrian and bicycle transport in
these areas. Note that in the interim the bicycle has virtu-
ally disappeared from Macao, replaced by the motorbike.
Fully 50% of the reclaimed land area will be devoted to
green and public area, presumably free of the ubiquitous
motorbike. A small part of the reclaimed land on island 4
(Figure 1), under the flight path to the airport, will be de-
voted to “creative industry”, along with public housing. It
is also intended that the main “streets” of the reclamation
areas will be green, pedestrianised corridors, with all
motor traffic relegated to service lanes located to the rear
or underground.
The proposed urban development densities on these
islands are high, or equivalent to that of the existing
Macao development or, not coincidentally, of Zhuhai.
All of these plans present a startling contrast to the
existing Macao. Although the area is very small, Macao
is awash in motorbikes and, with the rapidly rising in-
comes of Macao citizens, private cars. Traffic jams on
the tiny land area are a daily occurrence and the air
quality at street level is usually at unhealthy levels. The
existing waterfronts of Macao are poorly managed, and
few are accessible to the public. Moreover, pollution
from the Zhujiang River washes around Macao, making
its offshore water of very poor quality, brownish andturbid. For this reason, the islands plan includes a fresh
water body that will be of much higher quality, in
addition to the existing water reservoir (Figure 1). The
plan sets out an alternative model to existing Macao and
if carried out as planned, will be a remarkably different
kind of environment. But the plan is also intended to set
the tone and provide the infrastructure for transforming
the rest of Macao to a more sustainable and low carbon
future. The details of that transformation are far into the
future. What we can see is the infrastructure planned to
make such a transformation possible, as discussed in the
following section.Case description
The reclamation plan, in contrast to previous develop-
ments on reclaimed seabed, makes intensive use of
underground space, or in this case space below mean
sea level. The underground space of the new islands has
four functions:
1–Residential development dominates the whole plan,
in keeping with much of the real estate-led growth of
Mainland cities (Wang, 2014). Although planning docu-
ments emphasise the dearth of housing for work permit
inhabitants while Macao citizens are relatively well
housed, this new housing is clearly destined for the lux-
ury market. Isolated by water from existing Macao and
largely connected by underground tunnels, parking ga-
rages and local facilities, such plans read as virtual gated
communities. The plans include technical innovations,
in particular the relegation of all motor traffic to subter-
ranean levels, but such innovative ideas, if realised, are
also very typical of contemporary urban residential de-
velopments on the Mainland. Contemporary marketing
strategies for housing developments emphasise abundant
vegetation, water features and recreational possibilities,
achieved largely through taller buildings on smaller
footprints. Whether such approaches constitute a legit-
imate environmental agenda, as the discourse suggests,
remains questionable (Chang and Sheppard, 2013).
2–Island 4 will house a vastly expanded shopping en-
vironment, office buildings, more housing and car park-
ing facilities (Figure 2). Macao lacks a luxury goods
shopping hub as exists in Hong Kong. The strategy is to
diversify beyond gaming to shopping, although the 2014
crackdown on corruption on the Mainland has resulted
in a sharp drop in the market for luxury brands. Most of
the underground space on this reclaimed island will be
devoted to car parking, encasing the planned under-
ground metro line. Island 4 in particular exemplifies the
effort on the part of the government to meet needs of
the local population through a public space venue and
metro, while attempting to capture yet more capital out-
flows from the Mainland.
Figure 2 Schematic three-dimensional land use configuration and relationships on Island 4. (Redrawn (a) and interpreted from renderings
(b) by the author).
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pleted and is clearly intended to serve Mainland gam-
blers, since it by-passes residential areas to connect the
casinos with the port of entry (Figure 3). The LRT has
been hotly contested in the local media. The planned
metro line is intended to meet the needs of locals travel-
ling to the planned shopping and commercial hub.
4–Macao will need new public utilities. In particular,
Macao needs to conserve water and to recycle water
wherever possible since it not self-sufficient in water re-
sources. Its drinking water is sourced ever farther away
in Guangdong province as natural supplies and quality on
the Mainland decline. In addition, a burgeoning urban
population over the border in Mainland China means
there is increasing competition for scarcer water re-
sources. Thus, it is intended to create underground cis-
terns for water retention. Also, new power stations will
be located underground, along with warehousing.
From a technical standpoint, the land reclamation
programme will facilitate the creation of these under-
ground facilities. Typically, a retention dike is constructed
in the sea before the water is pumped out. Consolidation
of the seabed for construction can then proceed, with fur-
ther excavation where necessary. Fill is transported by
barge from the Zhujiang River in China. Although it is es-
timated that the costs of such sea reclamation are substan-
tial, in part due to geotechnical concerns for heavy, urban
construction, it is still much less expensive than under-
ground construction on existing land. It is for this reasonthat Macao has preferred to proceed with its first phase of
underground development on reclaimed seabed.
Duplo circulo et duplo eixo
It is largely through underground development that
Macao hopes to create this green open space and car-free
waterfront. A circle route is proposed at the fringes of the
islands consisting of a double tunnel, accommodating cars
in one instance and the metro in another. Two such
underground ring roads are proposed. This double circu-
lar system will be part of a three-dimensional public trans-
port system for Macao. At the moment, there is only a
public bus system on the ground, although it provides
good coverage, is very inexpensive and is well liked by lo-
cals. The system uses small buses in order to negotiate the
tortuous street system. The elevated LRT began construc-
tion in March, 2012, near the border crossing to Mainland
China, although as can be seen in Figure 3, it is a peri-
pheral line designed largely to serve the casinos. While
Macao’s air quality has declined sharply as a result of a
plethora of casino coaches transporting arriving gamblers
free of charge to the casinos, the hope is that the elevated
LRT will replace them. It is also hoped that this complex
public transportation system at three levels will convert
Macao from private transportation to a public system. In
this sense, it follows the plan of Taipei, Taiwan, where a
three-level system has also been built.
The real challenge will be the reduction in motorbike
traffic, which, like the casino buses, has contributed to
Figure 3 The LRT, metro and new underground roads plan. The circles represent mean walking distance from an unpublished survey
conducted by the Urban Planning Institute. (redrawn by the author from government reports).
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popular over the 2000–2010 decade because of the limited
road network but also the scarcity of car parking. It is
somewhat ironic that Macao, with the highest per capita
income among cities in Greater China and Asia, is the
only one with such a massive fleet of motorbikes. Pre-
vailing neo-liberal approaches of local authorities lead
planners to offer viable alternatives, like the metro and
LRT, but it remains less than certain that these high-
grade alternatives to getting around will actually lead to
modal shift. There is no announced plan for the reduc-
tion of motorbike use other than the provision of these
alternatives. Although large parts of the developed ter-
ritory could be served by non-motorised transport
(Figure 3), walking conditions tend to be poor. There
are many pedestrian bridges and poorly regulated ped-
estrian crossings at grade, making the walking experi-
ence uncomfortable if not perilous.
The tunneled circular road will provide access to under-
ground garages on the islands. Island 4, adjacent to the
customs port, is also intended to develop as an under-
ground commercial level similar to that in Montréal. Thistwo-level system will have a surface environment given
over to pedestrians, shopping and leisure activities, while
the level immediately below, and above the metro line, will
house shopping. The metro will then continue under the
Shizimen strait and service the remaining three islands off
the north coast of Taipa.
If successful and carried out as planned, this under-
ground circulation system will be the largest in the
world, far exceeding Boston’s Big Dig. The new develop-
ments will be very different in character and function
from the rest of Macao. By taking this step, it is clear
that the plan is intended to be a low-carbon model for
revitalisation of the rest of Macao. The form that such a
revitalisation effort could take is not yet clear, given the
morphology of the UNESCO site and the conventional
patterns of development on the earlier reclamation sites,
but is challenging to contemplate. The plans do not
elaborate on this hoped-for sustainable future, probably
because the policy changes that would make it possible
are difficult in the present socio-political context.
The Macao plan also proposes a much closer physical
integration with Zhuhai. The underground road tunnels
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new islands become an extension of Zhuhai’s planned
Shizimen CBD. The new housing of Macao has to be
read as a high-quality extension of the proposed Zhuhai
CBD, even if there remains a formal customs and immi-
gration border, the official spoken languages are differ-
ent, and traffic moves in opposite directions on each
side of this border (Figure 3). Macao’s bid to free itself
from the gambling umbilical cord somewhat ironically
involves forging even stronger relations with the Main-
land. Whether the reclaimed territory contributes to re-
defining economy and society in Macao, or becomes
instead an offshore playground for wealthy Mainlanders
remains an open question. To some observers, the new
consumerist landscape ties Macao ever more firmly to a
mainland still gripped by a producer economy and in
need of occasional escape (Simpson, 2008).
Discussion and evaluation
Macao’s vision of a car-free, low-carbon, seaside leisure
paradise is, of course, an illusion. This utopian vision is
really an extension of the promise proffered by casinos
that now dominate the Macao landscape. The green
paradise on the surface belies the pursuit of motorisation
when geography and metrics would seem to call for a
non-motorised environment.
Unlike Singapore and Hong Kong, Macao has made
no moves in the direction of restricting motor vehicles.
Although the land mass is much smaller than these two
other island city-states, and with higher population den-
sity, Macao has taken a transport pathway closer to that
on the Mainland. However, Zhuhai, has not only banned
motorbikes but also electric bicycles, while devoting much
space to car infrastructure. As incomes in Macao rose rap-
idly from 2000, people have acquired motorbikes and then
cars. The approach in the new development is to use
underground space, at least in part, to move and store the
cars. The planned flows between Zhuhai and Macao, in
contrast with those between Shenzhen and Hong Kong,
are motorised. In this sense, the plan is designed to ac-
commodate the market and to implement a synchrony
with its Mainland neighbour.
What is in the plan for the Macao population? The
LRT in its initial phase will largely serve the casino in-
dustry, not everyday activities of the resident population.
It will nevertheless be a challenge to wean visitors off
the free shuttle buses provided by the casinos at the
ports of entry, since the majority of visitors stay in
Macao for less than a day. The very expensive under-
grounding of the metro does allow the development of a
climate-controlled shopping and cultural environment
that presently does not exist. It would have been feasible
to cover the entire territory with a tram network to re-
place the minibus system, but it would also require aradical shift of road space to public transport, which in
the present political context is difficult. Nor is such top-
down management of the local economy part of Macao’s
history, notable for corrupt local governance and neo-
liberalism (Luke, 2010). It is entirely in keeping with this
historical background that the local government would
continue to support a commercialised land market, un-
regulated motorisation and a two-tier social structure.
Only in the interests of maintaining the health of the
local casino industry, if not the traditional Macao culin-
ary and service culture, is the government intervening to
develop social housing. On the other hand, the physical
environment of the proposed expansion areas is radically
different from what Macanese can experience in their
city today, or by citizens of Zhuhai for that matter. The
ground level will be a garden, rather than a tangle of
traffic-choked streets. The planning documents make
clear that this radical departure in the character of the
surface environment is intended to effect a change in
local thinking about the environment. This diffusion ef-
fect has worked elsewhere.
How could the underground space in the new islands
be used? Arguably, two levels could be used effectively
for all urban uses–shops, community facilities, education
and even habitation by exploiting the elevation differ-
ence. Macao has weak road links between north and
south. Yet if cars were not used for daily purposes in
Macao, these road links would nevertheless be adequate
to get cars in and out of Macao, with modest modifica-
tion of the road network in peninsular Macao.
The hoped-for diversification of the local economy
finds no home in the islands scheme except for a tiny
“creative industry park” below the flight path to the
airport. Arguably, the new campus of the University of
Macao, with real and symbolic isolation from the gam-
bling heart via a single tunnel to Hengqin Island, is a
step in this direction. In planning undergraduate educa-
tion in near-rural isolation from urban distractions, it
follows a familiar pattern on the Mainland. However,
this important investment in education also represents
another kind of gamble–that youth can be weaned off
easy money and the casino job market.
Conclusions
In the years following market liberalisation in China, cities
were largely left to their own devices to develop. While
central government loosened the regulatory framework to
allow local governmental and private initiative, provincial
authorities exerted little control over urban development.
In recent years, however, central government policies have
re-asserted themselves in local development. Macao’s ex-
plosive development could not have occurred without the
regulations put in place by the central government. Pro-
vincial authority has also returned as an important local
Zacharias City, Territory and Architecture  (2015) 2:2 Page 9 of 9force, as regional transport networks link cities and new
relations are forged between cooperating and competing
local entities. Macao’s prosperity is arguably dependent
on renewed and vigorous intervention on the part of
other cities in the PRD, the province and the central
government. While Macao enjoys relative freedom on
its own territory, with its own financial, legal and edu-
cational system, its future is increasingly tied to the
Mainland.
The Macao plan reflects this duality of identity in very
physical terms. Planning priorities, including the order
in which they will be carried out, support economic de-
velopment and closer integration with the Mainland. A
richer Macao in the short run is accompanied by the
promise of longer-term improvements to the public en-
vironment, starting with a few highly visible projects on
new territory. In this sense, Macao has adopted much
the same strategy as the vast majority of Mainland cities,
where rapidly deteriorating environmental quality is ac-
companying a rise in personal disposable income for
those with urban resident rights.
As the literature on cross-border integration shows,
localities assume or are assigned roles in a complex and
highly hierarchical regional structure. Macao has clearly
decided to play a supporting role in the integration with
its Mainland neighbours as a leisure and entertainment
venue but also as a place to enjoy the good life. The ris-
ing proportion of relatively low-income migrant workers
needed to support this good life could be the source of
significant future tensions, as other cases demonstrate
(Timberlake et al., 2014). Just what young graduates of
the universities in Macao will do, besides working in the
service industry, remains unclear since there is no plan
for the development of an alternate economy and indeed
no place where it could flourish. The current Five
Islands plan, like many launched throughout China, is
heavy on imagery and light on process.
The Macao utopian future, as suggested in this paper,
may be a chimera, like most of the claimed sustainable
urban developments on the Mainland (Chang and
Sheppard, 2013). The appearance of utopia in a moment
of suspended disbelief, underwritten by the massive
profits of gambling, serves Macao’s present and future
as a playground for Mainlanders. A plantation forest of
high-rise housing (islands 1, 2, 3 in Figure 1) bears little
relation with the region’s rich architectural legacy, but
serves a marketing strategy aimed perhaps at local in-
vestment opportunities, perhaps at Mainlanders if the
present acquisition rules are relaxed. The islands prom-
ise a green paradise for recreation, but are largely iso-
lated and inaccessible to Macao’s present population.
But, as the planning documents emphasise, it may be
that the realisation of such a utopian vision may spur on
a genuine project for a sustainable and livable Macao.Competing interests
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